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This paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal-agent  problem and 
compares the results to the stylized facts of CEO compensation.  The numerical 
predictions come from parameterizing the models of Grossman and Hart and of 
Holmstrom and Milgrom.  While the correct incentives for a CEO can greatly 
enhance a firm's performance,  providing such incentives need not be expensive. 
For many parameter values,  CEO compensation need only increase by about $10 
for every $1,000  of additional shareholder value; for some values, the amount 
is 0.003 cents.  The paper thus answers two challenges posed by Jensen: that 
principal-agent  theory does not yield quantitative predictions, and that CEO 
compensation is insufficiently sensitive to firm performance. 
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The principal-agent  paradigm lies at the center of corporate finance. 
Its central problem of motivating a subordinate provides sharp insight into 
issues surrounding debt,  equity,  dividends, executive pay, and regulators' 
activities during the thrift debacle.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) challenge this 
paradigm, finding that the compensation of top executives increases a mere 
$3.25 per $1,000  gain in shareholder wealth.  This pay-performance  sensitivity 
of 0.003 is a far cry from the 1.0 predicted by the risk-neutral  version of 
principal-agent  theory.  Their estimate challenges broader versions of the 
theory to predict anything quantitative at all.  In moving beyond risk 
neutrality, "...theory says nothing about the magnitude of the pay/performance 
relation" (Baker,  Jensen,  and Murphy  [1988],  p. 611). 
Yet,  as this paper shows,  principal-agent  theory can yield exact 
quantitative predictions.  Grossman and Hart (1983) provide such a solution 
for a two-state,  finite-action  model.  Once a few parameters are chosen, 
quantitative results follow.  Thus, it becomes possible to find what 
principal-agent  theory predicts for the cases Jensen and Murphy consider. 
In the parameterized models, small amounts of risk aversion can result 
in  quite low values of pay sensitivity.  The results in this paper thus 
respond to both of the challenges issued by Jensen and Murphy:  providing 
quantitative predictions, and predicting low pay-performance  sensitivity.  The 
results also confirm their intuition that incentives matter greatly for 
executive performance and consequently for shareholder value. 
One motive for pursuing the quantitative approach is the success it has 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfound in related fields.  Asset pricing has long benefited from a fruitful 
interplay between empirical work and quantitative models.  So has public 
finance,  where authors from Mirrlees (1971) to Sheshinski (1989) have used 
quantitative solutions to the "hidden type" (as opposed to the "hidden action" 
type considered here) principal-agent  problem to calculate the optimal income 
tax. 
The following section provides more detail on pay sensitivity.  Section 
I11 reviews the model and the needed analytical results,  all of which follow 
from Grossman and Hart. Section IV reports the numerical solutions,  and 
section V compares the results with similar calculations based on a model from 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).  Section VI concludes. 
11. Performance Pay 
The argument about pay sensitivity has both a descriptive and a 
prescriptive component.  In the descriptive part of their analysis,  Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) carefully gather data and assess the pay-performance  sensitivity 
for chief executive officers (CEOs) in the Forbes Executive Compensation 
Survey,  encompassing salary,  bonus, stock options, insider stock holdings,  and 
dismissal probability.  By the narrowest measure, salary plus bonus,  which 
excludes savings plans, thrift plans, other benefits, and stock holdings and 
options, the pay-performance  sensitivity is 0.0000135,  or 1.35 cents per 
$1,000  of shareholder value. By the broadest measure,  which looks at changes 
in CEO wealth and includes Forbes' "total compensation,"  stock options and 
insider stock holdings,  present value of changes in salary and bonus, and the 
effects of dismissal,  total pay-performance  sensitivity is $3.25 per $1,000, 
or 0.00325. 
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Review article, "Eclipse of the Public Corporation" (1989).  He argues here 
that publicly traded corporations do not resolve the conflict between 
shareholders and managers as well as do leveraged buyout (LBO) associations. 
In  LBO associations,  executive salaries are close to 20 times more sensitive 
to performance than in  public corporations.  As Jensen states (p. 69),  "It's 
not hard to understand why an executive who receives $200 for every $1,000 
increase in shareholder wealth will unlock more value than an executive who 
receives $3.25." 
In  addition to suggesting that theory cannot explain the quantitative 
fact,  Jensen and Murphy also present qualitative evidence against a standard 
principal-agent  interpretation for executive pay.  They point out the superior 
performance of LBO associations,  the decline in equity holding among officers 
over time,  and the sparse use of additional information in compensation 
schemes.  The principal-agent  model can potentially explain these results, 
because parameter values can differ across firms and across time.  This paper 
generally avoids those issues, though section V briefly considers why 
additional information may be ignored. 
111.  Model and Analytical Results 
Though the principal-agent  model is a natural one for executive 
compensation,  with shareholders as the principal and the CEO as the agent, 
most versions have intractable solutions.  Quantitative predictions do not 
readily emerge from the implicit equations that define the sharing rules, 
especially in  models with a continuum of states.  Grossman and Hart (1983, 
sec. 4), however,  provide a tractable solution to the two-state,  finite-action 
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quantitative  prediction. 
To appreciate both the scope and the limitations of the numerical 
calculations,  it helps to know the basic model structure and the theorems that 
justify the later work. 
Assumptions and Notation 
The principal, or firm,  has two gross profit levels,  q1<q2.  The agent 
can choose from a finite set A of actions, (al,az,  ...a,,), which influences the 
probability of good and bad profits.  These might be viewed as effort levels, 
or different projects the CEO can approve.  Formally, &(a)  denotes the 
probability of state (profit level) i given action a. 
The agent's utility depends on actions and on income,  expressed as 
U(a,I).  Solving the model requires some restrictions on U,  expressed in 
Assum~tion  Al: U(a,I)=  G(a)+K(a)V(I),  where 
i)  V is real,  continuous,  strictly increasing,  and concave on an open interval 
(I,, a); 
ii)  LimI,,I,V(I)=-co; 
iii) G and K are real,  continuous on A and K>O; 
iv)  For all a,b  contained in A and all I,J  contained in (I,,a), 
G(a)+K(a)V(I)  LG(b)+K(b)V(I)  implies 
This formulation makes preferences over income risk independent of 
action (the converse is also true),  and makes the agent risk averse. 
The numerical calculations of section IV further specialize the utility 
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constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) type with 
V (I)-  -e-*  I, ~(a)=e*  a, so U(a,I)=  -e-*(l-a), 
in which effort appears as negative income.  The disutility of effort greatly 
influences management compensation;  treating effort as negative income makes 
the resulting contract easier to interpret. 
The agent also has a c,  derived from an alternative employment or 
leisure-time  activity he can turn to if he does not work for the principal.  I 
exclude actions so distasteful that the agent would never choose them,  and to 
keep the problem interesting I  assume that some actions remain.  This 
particivation constraint is embodied in 
Assumvtion A2:  For every action a contained in A,  there is an I in (I,,  Q) 
such that G(a)+K(a)V(I)  1  c. 
The final assumption puts some structure on the probability of profits. 
Assumvtion A3:  For all a contained in A and i-1 ...  n,  &(a)  > 0. 
This rules out the Mirrlees (1974) plan of imposing increasingly high 
penalties with increasingly low probabilities as the agent takes actions 
approaching the right one: Since &(a)  > 0  and A is finite, such a strategy 
puts too much risk on the agent. 
One major advance of Grossman and Hart is to focus on the cost of 
getting the agent to choose a particular action.  In the "first  best" case,  in 
which the principal observes the action,  the cost is simply the agent's 
reservation  price for a,  denoted 
CFB(~)=~[  (v-~(a))/~(a) ] , where h=~-'. 
Of course,  the whole point of the principal-agent  problem is that the 
5 
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the realized output state,  the gross profit level.  This incentive scheme,  a 
set of payments contingent on the state (11,12),  gives the agent utility 
levels 
v1=V(I1) 
vz=V(Iz)  . 
Although the principal cannot observe the action,  she can design an 
incentive scheme that induces the agent to choose that action.  This defines 
the second-best  cost of an action a*, C(a*). 
2 
(1)  Choose v,,  v2 to minimize x  IIi  (a*)  h  vi) 
i  =l 
subject to 
2 
G(a*)  + K(a*)  [  Di  (a*) vi] 2 G(a) + K(a) [  IIi(a)viIva'arA 
i=l  i=l 
2 
G(a*)  + K(a*)  [ x  ni  (a*)  vi]  t  i 
i=l 
vie  Range  (V)  Vi  . 
The first constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint,  which 
states that the agent takes action a*  only if that action gives a higher 
payoff than any other action.  The second and third constraints are the 
participation constraints,  which state that the agent must get a certain 
minimum utility,  and that there exists an income level that produces the 
desired utility. 
Several incentive schemes (I or v sets) may induce the agent to choose 
action a*  (that is,  implement a*).  Define C(a*)  as the greatest lower bound 
(infinurn or in£) of mi  h(vi)  on the constraint set of equation (1).  For an 
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cannot induce action a*. 
A little terminology about the principal completes the basic notation. 
Because the risk-neutral  principal gets the gross profits,  her expected 
benefit from an agent's  action is 
B(a)  = mi  (a)qi. 




The simple solution used below depends on some general theorems due to 
Grossman and Hart.  At least a passing familiarity with these ideas is 
necessary in order to understand the range and restrictions on the results. 
From the general n-state  case,  I take two main results.  Proposition 1 
states that assuming Al,  A2, and A3,  there exists a second-best  optimal action 
and a second-best  optimal incentive scheme.  Proposition 6  states that for 
finite A,  the agent is indifferent between the action he takes and some less 
costly actions under the optimal incentive scheme. 
Three results for the two-state  case make possible an explicit 
calculation of the solution.  First,  a definition:  Action a is efficient if 
the probability of a good outcome can be increased only by incurring a greater 
cost.  Proposition 10 states that assuming Al,  A2,  A3, and V are strictly 
concave,  with two states every second-best  action is efficient. 
The next propositions also restrict possible solutions. Proposition 11 
states that under the conditions of Proposition 10,  the agent obtains his 
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states,  adding new actions a', such that CFB(a')  2 CFB(a)  for all a in  A, 
cannot make the principal worse off.  That is,  adding distasteful actions 
won't  encourage the agent to shirk but might give the principal more 
information. 
Solution Techniques for the Two-State,  Finite-Action  Case 
Grossman and Hart have a simple plan for solving the principal-agent 
problem.  First,  compute the cost C(a)  for each action a. Then optimize the 
net benefit, B(a)-C(a),  over all actions a.  Several special results make this 
unusually easy in the two-state,  finite-action  case. 
Proposition 6,  that the agent is indifferent between the chosen action 
and some less costly action, combines with Proposition 10,  that the agent 
chooses only efficient actions,  to drastically simplify the cost and 
probability structure.  Without loss of generality,  we can assume that 
CFB(al)<CFB(a2)<.  .  .<CFB(%)  and correspondingly I12(al)  < I12(a2)  < . .  .< 112(%)  . 
Because there is no conflict in getting the agent to take the least costly 
(minimum effort) action al,  C  (al)=CFB(al).  This ties down C(al) . 
For the other actions, I use Proposition 6 and Proposition 11 to compute 
C(ak).  For each action aj for j<k, find the I,,  1,  pair that makes the agent 
indifferent between ak and aj and that also sets that common expected utility 
to t. Finding v, and v2,  the utility levels that satisfy those two 
conditions,  involves solving two simultaneous linear equations. 
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Solving for vl  and v2 yields 
The incentive scheme, or actual payments to the agent,  comes from inverting 
the utility function,  setting I1=h(vl) and 12-h(v2) . 
This gives (k-1)  different (vl,v2)  pairs and hence (k-1)  different 
(11,12)  pairs, one for each j<k.  Proposition 6  says that one of these pairs 
must be the minimum cost-incentive  scheme for ak;  that will tell us C(ak). 
Grossman and Hart show that incentive compatibility implies it is the pair 
with the largest v2.  With any other pair, the agent would prefer action aj to 
action ak. 
The (v1,v2)  pair chosen for each action ak must then be checked against 
the range of V.  For example, exponential or power utility functions are 
always negative,  but the above procedure sometimes demands strictly positive 
utility.  In that case,  C(ak)  is infinite: The principal cannot induce that 
behavior from the agent.  For the feasible vi's,  cost is simply the expected 
value of payments to the agent,  or 
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Once the second-best  cost C(ak)  is computed for each k,  the problem 
becomes straightforward. The principal chooses among a finite number of 
actions to maximize B(a)-C(a). 
IV.  Numerical Solutions 
Section I11 outlines a way to calculate exact quantitative solutions to 
simple principal-agent  models.  I  now choose the parameters and perform the 
calculations,  applying the model to the executive compensation problems of 
Jensen and Murphy. 
The model has many free parameters.  These include the payoff, risk 
aversion, disutility of effort,  reservation utility, and outcome state 
probabilities,  as well as the effects of action on probabilities, number of 
actions,  and functional forms.  Even those parameters previously estimated, 
such as risk aversion,  do not have standard,  accepted values.  Others, such as 
the CEO's effect on share value, are conceivably measurable, but serious 
practical problems prevent measurement.  Still others,  such as the number of 
actions,  have no real empirical counterpart. 
To overcome this, I  present a variety of solutions for different 
parameter values.  When possible, I  use the estimates of Jensen and Murphy, 
such as the standard deviation of shareholder value and the average 
compensation of CEOs.  For parameters they do not estimate, such as disutility 
of effort,  I take values from their illustrative examples.  For the remaining 
parameters, such as risk aversion,  I  use a range of values.  Thus,  the model 
predicts outcomes for the cases Jensen and Murphy discuss using parameter 
values that are close to what most people would consider sensible. 
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only a small subset of possible predictions.  Some later examples explore the 
broader range of possibilities by using more extreme values. 
Base  Case 
The first (base) case has two states and three actions.  The standard 
deviation of shareholder wealth in the Jensen and Murphy samples is $200 
million (p. 244).  For a two-point  distribution  with x > y,  the standard 
deviation is dm  (x-y).  For p=1/2, this further simplifies to  (  1 
3) 
(x-y).  Putting all monetary rewards in units of $1 million ($lo6),  I choose 
gross profit levels of 300 and 700. 
Jensen and Murphy do not specify a reservation  wage; I  use the median 
CEO compensation for their sample,  $490,000.  For later robustness checks, I 
use $250,000,  which is Business Week's  estimate of Sanford Grossman's  academic 
salary (Byrne [1988]). 
I  use constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),  or exponential utility. 
This method has several advantages:  It provides a simple interpretation of 
effort as negative income,  it is robust to differences in the wealth of the 
agents,  and it facilitates comparison with the recent consumption literature 
(Caballero [1990]),  which also uses CARA.  Unfortunately,  it makes comparisons 
with the asset pricing literature,  which uses constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA), more difficult.  Given wealth levels,  though, it is easy to calculate 
relative risk aversion.  As an additional check,  I  provide a few calculations 
using CRRA. 
More parameters come from recasting an example from Jensen and Murphy 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(p. 228).  The CEO considers a project he privately values at $100,000,  but 
which costs the firm $10 million.  This translates into the principal-agent 
framework as follows:  Let the set of acts be A=(0.001,0.1,0.2).  To the 
agent, taking action al  is like paying $1,000,  taking action az is like paying 
$100,000,  and taking action a3 is like paying $200,000.  From the shareholder's 
viewpoint,  each action increases the probability of the good state,  where 
shareholder value is 700,  by 0.025, so 
I12(al)  = 0.475 
IIz(az)  = -0.5 
&(a3)  = 0.525. 
Taking action az instead of al  thus results in (0.025)~(700-300),  or a $10 
million gain in expected shareholder value at a personal cost of $99,000.  I 
choose nine values for risk aversion, setting 7  = 0.125  to 1.125 by increments 
of 0.125. Because 7  measures absolute risk aversion, it is not strictly 
comparable to the more common measures of relative risk aversion, such as the 
29 of Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) or the 2-3  of Friend and Blume (1977). 
Using a wealth estimate from Jensen and Murphy (CEO-controlled  company stock 
holdings) of $8.8 million gives a relative risk aversion of 1.1 to 9.9. 
Figure 1 presents the results for the base case,  plotting the profit 
share against risk aversion.  Profit share is the increase in CEO compensation 
divided by the increase in shareholder value between the good and the bad 
state,  or Wage(state2)-Wage(state1)/(700-300).  Table 1 reports the actual 
numbers.  The profit share fraction,  when positive,  varies from around 0.01 to 
0.03,  implying that CEOs get an extra $10 to $30 for a $1,000  increase in 
shareholder  value.  Table 1 reports an overabundance of negative wages. 
Realistically,  negative compensation sometimes results,  because stock holdings 
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wages,  while equally unrealistic,  would dramatically alter the principal-agent 
problem (Sappington [1983]). 
For -y  > 0.625,  the profit share is zero,  implying the agent takes the 
easiest possible action.  Income shows no response to shareholder value:  The 
profit share fraction is 0.  Everyone knew this held as y  approached 
infinity,  but it is a definite surprise that a number less than 1 counts as 
"close to infinity."  For some plausible parameter values, the 0.00325 value 
of Jensen and Murphy looks too sensitive.  Perhaps the low profit share Jensen 
and Murphy find in the data reflects an average including a few zeros. 
The positive profit shares in table 1 underscore a related message of 
Jensen,  however.  The response of executive pay to firm performance, though 
slight,  significantly increases the firm's value.  A positive profit share 
makes sense only if it induces the agent to work more, to choose a2 or a3 
instead of al.  In  my example,  this is a gain to shareholders of $10  million 
or $20 million.  Because the principal must compensate the agent for the risk 
involved, if the agent still takes the lowest action he gains nothing and the 
principal loses.  Furthermore,  because the principal (shareholders) maximizes 
net benefits,  a less sensitive scheme (though cheaper) would induce the agent 
to pick a lower action,  at a substantial cost. 
Do these results make sense? Is there any reason behind the particular 
values shown in table l? One advantage of an explicit model is that we can 
explore such questions and deepen our intuition about the problem.  In 
general,  the compensation  contract represents a trade-off  between insurance 
and incentives.  A risk-neutral  agent would bear all of the risk and accept a 
profit share of 1,  but a risk-averse  agent would naturally desire to shift 
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can quantify both sides of the trade-off  and understand what motivates the 
principal and the agent. 
The contracts in table 1 clearly share risk between the principal and 
the agent.  At a risk aversion of 0.125,  wages in the good and bad state 
differ by $4 million (four units in the table).  The agent would pay $365,000 
to avoid this risk. To keep the agent at his reservation  utility, the 
principal must compensate him with a risk premium for accepting this 
uncertainty. If the agent bore the full profit uncertainty (+$200 million), 
he would demand a risk premium of $194 million. As Sappington ([1991], p. 49) 
puts it, "To conserve on the risk premium she must award the agent for bearing 
risk,  the principal will choose to bear some risk herself." 
Providing insurance to the agent creates its own problems,  however.  As 
noted by Sappington (1991,  pp. 49-50), "When  he is effectively insured against 
bad outcomes under the optimal contract,  the agent will exert less effort to 
avoid these bad outcomes."  A closer look at the base-case  contracts of table 
1 shows that they do provide strong incentives to the agent despite relatively 
low prof  it shares. 
One reason  behind the low profit share is the difference between 
expected gains and realized gains.  For a risk aversion of 0.125,  the wage 
difference of $4 million translates into a rather modest profit share 0.01,  or 
$10 per $1,000.  But the CEO does not directly determine shareholder value; he 
merely changes the odds.  Choosing a2 over al  increases expected shareholder 
value by $10 million; choosing a3 adds another $10 million.  From this 
perspective,  his compensation  more closely matches his contribution. 
From another perspective, the agent's pay also matches his contribution. 
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own expected value of pay by 0.025  x $4,000,000,  or $100,000,  his disutility 
of effort from taking that action. 
Robustness Checks 
The base case directly confronts the theoretical challenge posed by 
Jensen and Murphy, but as a single example,  its results might be special or 
unrepresentative. The next few tables and figures report on variations of the 
base case.  Changes include risk aversion and the agent's effect on profit, 
number of acts,  and reservation utility. 
The first set varies both risk aversion and the agent's effect on the 
probability of the gross profit level.  The relation between the agent's 
effort and the probability of success is given by another new parameter, 
APROB. As APROB gets bigger, good actions increase the expected probability of 
the good state by an increasing amount. In the three-act  case, 
I12(a,)  = 0.5-APROB 
I12(a2)  = 0.5 
U2(a3)  - 0.5+APROB. 
In the next two tables,  APROB varies from 0.00625 to 0.05625 by increments of 
0.00625. It thus provides a range around the base-case  value of 0.025. 
Table 2 and figure 2 report the results.  For high APROB and low risk 
aversion,  table 2 shows CEOs getting between $4 and $5 per $1,000,  moving a 
step closer to the $3.25 finding of  Jensen and Murphy. 
Figure 3 presents the results with a reservation  wage of 0.25 
($250,000). The share results hardly change,  as befits CARA.  Wage levels are 
correspondingly lower,  but are not reported. 
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instead of the three used above,  with similar results. 
To some people, the relative risk aversion (7 times wealth) in these 
examples may seem too high.  The next two figures address that problem. 
Figure 5 looks at absolute risk aversion between 0.0025  and 0.0225.  Figure 6 
shows profit share for very low levels of risk aversion.  Even a billionaire 
would have relative risk aversion below 0.00000001  with these preferences. 
Even so,  the pay-performance  ratio stays close to 0.01,  or $10 for every 
$1,000.  Low performance pay does not require high risk aversion. 
In addition, figures 5 and 6  together emphasize the nonlinearity and 
nonmonotonic relationship between risk aversion and profit share. They show 
both a local minimum and a more extreme nonmonotonicity. 
Extreme Cases 
The principal-agent  model predicts a wider range of behavior than the 
results so far suggest.  The profit share can approach one quite closely.  It 
can also approach zero and still retain some pay-performance  sensitivity. 
Figure 7 shows the results of changing A to (0.01,10,20),  APROB to 
0.025,  and the risk-aversion  range to 1  x 10-l2  to 9 x 10-12.  The figure shows 
nonlinearity and a profit share around 0.999,  or $999 per $1,000. 
Figure 8  and Table 4  report the results for the CRRA case.  This 
calculation holds risk aversion constant at 9 and varies APROB from 0.05 to 
0.45, in increments of 0.05.  This means &(a3)  varies from 0.55 to 0.95. 
The act set is A=(1,10,15),  and the disutility of effort function is (1/20)a2. 
The reservation  wage is 0.25.  These parameters result in a low profit share 
fraction,  which ranges from 0.000000033 to 0.0000003.  This implies that 
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of shareholder wealth.  In some cases, then, it takes little to motivate a 
CEO. 
V.  Com~arison  with Holmstrom and Mil~rom  Results 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),  by making stronger assumptions, simplify 
the calculations even more.  They take a strategy diametrically opposed to 
that behind the two-state,  finite-action  case.  They start by complicating the 
model.  Essentially, the agent has so much freedom that only simple linear 
rules provide the correct incentives. 
The agent controls the drift rate of a stochastic process z over a time 
period of one unit.  The process z evolves according to the equation 
dz=pdt +dB.  The agent has a CARA utility,  with quadratic disutility of 
effort. The cost to the agent of controlling the drift is c(p)=(k/2)02. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom show that the optimal compensation  rule takes the form 
a  z + /I,  with the optimal pay-performance  ratio of 
Under this incentive scheme,  the agent chooses a constant value of  p. In 
that sense, the problem reduces to a static setting. 
I  translate the Jensen and Murphy examples into this framework as 
follows.  First,  let the unit time period be one year.  The controlled process 
is shareholder wealth,  whose standard deviation of 200 means a variance of 
40,000. Assume a risk aversion y  of one.  If a project worth $10,000,000  (10 
units) to the shareholders decreases the utility of the agent by $100,000 (0.1 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmunits),  this implies a k value of 0.018. Substituting these values into 
equation (4), I obtain a pay-performance  sensitivity of 0.00138,  or $1.38 for 
every $1,000. 
More generally, the formula expressing profit share as a function of 
risk aversion,  keeping the disutility at 0.1  for 10,  is 1/(1+800  7  e-7/1°). 
Figure 9  plots profit share against risk aversion for 100  values of risk 
aversion running from 0.025 to 2.5.  Profit share runs from $47 per $1,000  of 
shareholder value to 6  cents per $1,000. 
The Holmstrom-Milgrom  approach has less flexibility than that of 
Grossman and Hart.  It can  neither use CRRA nor measure effort as negative 
income,  much less use the more general forms allowed by Al.  Controlling a 
drift (but not variance) term is less general than changing outcome 
probabilities.  For these reasons,  the Grossman-Hart  approach seems the more 
desirable one. 
The Holmstrom-Milgrom  approach,  however,  has an additional advantage 
beyond computational simplicity.  It can explain why the principal ignores 
additional information about the agent's action.  For example,  shareholders 
may have information about revenues and expenses, in addition to profits. 
When the agent has some discretion over how to account for revenues and 
expenses,  this information should not influence his compensation.  Note 
further that even in the simplest case embodied in equation (4). a great deal 
of information is ignored.  Agent compensation depends only on a time 
aggregate of total profits at year end,  not on performance at each date. 
At this level of analysis, there is no need to choose between the two 
approaches.  The two sets of results confirm each other.  Both predict low 
levels of pay-performance  sensitivity,  even for low levels of risk aversion. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmVI.  Conclusion 
Owners and managers must decide how to share profits.  That decision 
lies behind executive compensation,  shareholding,  the firm's debt-equity  mix, 
and even takeover policy.  Yet, the quantitative theoretical predictions about 
that sharing are rare: a share of 1 for a risk-neutral  agent,  and a share of 0 
for an infinitely risked agent. Where do real-world  cases fit in? 
This paper has used two methodologies,  one due to Grossman and Hart and 
one due to Holmstrom and Milgrom, to compute quantitative solutions.  The 
results should not be considered a test of  principal-agent  theory.  The paper 
does not formally confront a specified hypothesis with data.  It should 
rather be seen as an  application  of that theory. 
A test is, in principle, possible with this methodology. Assuming a 
distribution across parameters will produce a distribution  across profit 
shares and wages, and this distribution could be compared with estimated 
values.  Empirically identifying the model requires restricting the joint 
distribution of APROB, reservation utility, and risk aversion,  about which I 
have little intuition.  It seems better to leave explicit tests for future 
work. 
Still,  I  would like to claim that the results do provide information 
about the correspondence between principal-agent  theory and reality.  Two 
lessons emerge from the exercise:  (1) Low profit shares can occur with low 
risk aversion,  and (2)  even low profit shares provide incentives and 
substantially increase the value of the firm. 
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Wages and Profit Shares -  CRRA Case 
Wane 
Bad State  Good State  Profit Share Fraction 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Risk Aversion-Base  Case 
risk  aversion 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Agent Effect and Risk Aversion 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Agent Effect and Risk Aversion-$250,000  Reservation Wage 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Agent Effect and Risk Aversion-1  1  -Act Case 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Risk Aversion-Low  Risk Aversion 
risk aversion 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Risk Aversion-Extremely  Low Risk Aversion 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
risk  aversion  x  10-l2 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Risk Aversion-High  Profit Share 
3  4  5  6 
risk  aversion 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Profit Share vs. Agent Effect-CRRA  Case 
0.2  0.3 
gain in  prob 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Profit Sliare vs. Risk Aversion-Holmstrom-Milgrom  Model 
risk aversion 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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